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Abstract
In this work we discuss a formal way of dealing with properties of con-
textual systems. Our approach is to assume that properties describing the
same physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts,
are indistinguishable in a strong sense. To construct the formal theoret-
ical structure, we develop a description using quasi-set theory, which is
a set-theoretical framework built to describe collections of elements that
violate Leibnitz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles. This allows us to
consider a new ontology in order to study properties of quantum systems.
1 Introduction
The concept of a property of a quantum system is hard to define consistently.
For instance, in a famous paper [22], Kochen and Specker (KS) showed that
attempting to assign truth values to a quantum property [38, 31], as predicted
by the algebra of observables in a Hilbert space, may result in logical contra-
dictions unless we assume that properties depend on which other properties are
being simultaneously observed with it. This dependency is what is known in
the literature as contextuality, reflecting the idea that properties are context-
dependent —context being defined by the other simultaneously observed quan-
tities. Quantum contextuality creates the difficulty that the value of a property
becomes dependent on the observer’s choice of what context to measure it in,
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i.e. with which other properties, and not with an intrinsic characteristic of the
measured quantum system.
The contextual dependency of properties of quantum particles seems to be an
essential aspect of the microscopic world. It is related not only to the Kochen-
Specker apparent paradox above mentioned, but also to Bell’s proof of the in-
compatibility of quantum predictions with local-realism [1]. It is also an im-
portant resource in quantum computation [37], and perhaps the main reason
why quantum computers outperform their classical counterparts [19]. Thus, it
is not surprising that extensive research in contextuality has happened in recent
decades, with entire conferences devoted to it (such as the Quantum Contex-
tuality in Quantum Mechanics and Beyond workshop in Prague, or the Winer
Memorial Lectures at Purdue University).
This paper examines contextuality in physics by extending a point of view
put forth on references [9] and [28], namely that quantum indistinguishability
is connected to contextuality. In [9], we argued that the indistinguishability of
particles, expressed mathematically by a set-theoretical construct where the law
of identity of indiscernibles is violated, invalidates the contradiction argument
put forth by Kochen and Specker (KS) in [22] (see Section 2 for a sketch of
the KS argument). In their paper, KS discuss the concept of quantum proper-
ties, represented by self-adjoint operators in a Hilbert space [39], and show that
attempts to assign truth values to those properties in different experimental
contexts fail if we assume that such properties are context-independent. We ar-
gued that KS argument was not necessarily valid for quantum systems because,
since particles are in principle indistinguishable, it is not possible to say that
we are talking about property X or Y of particle A or particle B. All we know is
that, in the case of A and B, we have two particles, and that they have different
properties X and Y, but we cannot, in principle, know which one has property
X or property Y.
Here we extend the above notion to show that it is not just the indistin-
guishability of particles that may be at play in physics, but also the indistin-
guishability of properties, seem here as a representation of the conjunction of a
specific measurement apparatus and a physical (quantum) system (e.g. a parti-
cle). In other words, as in the case of particles, we cannot know which property
we are talking about. Two properties, A and A’, may be indistinguishable, and
this indistinguishability leads to apparent paradoxes if we treat them, as often
is done in physics, as one and the same.
The idea of indistinguishability of properties can be seen as stemming from
[14]. In that reference, it is argued that contextuality is about the identity of
properties, in the sense that, properties taken from different contexts must be
considered different. In reference [14]’s approach, properties are assumed to obey
the classical theory of identity, formalized in it by the use of random variables in
a probability space. The connection between identity and contextuality seems
to also appear in the formalism of QM. Take the case of three observables, such
as Bell’s case where observables A and A′ refer to Alice’s observations and B to
Bob’s. The self-adjoint operators in the subspace representing Bob’s observable
B are the same when Alice measures A or A′, regardless of whether Alice’s
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choice of measurement. It seems to be the same property, among the different
contexts of measurement. The experimental setup is the same as well: there is an
operationally identifiable procedure that allows us to say that we are measuring
A, on each instance. But yet, if we assume that all those instances represent
one and the same property, we are lead to contradictions. This situation leads
the authors of [14] to conclude that the a properties associated to the same
physical quantity, but considered in different contexts, cannot be the same. So,
the distinction between B in context A and B in context B′ is only that they
are different properties, but not distinguishable. If they were distinguishable,
i.e. if Bob could run an experiment where he could, just looking at B, determine
Alice’s choice of measuring A or A′, they would be able to use this to signal
to each other in a superluminal way. This, of course, is forbidden by quantum
mechanics [10].
How to make sense of the assertion that properties are different among dif-
ferent contexts, while it is, at the same time, the same quantity being measured?
Reference [14] takes the approach of just using different random variables for
each context. Though this is logically consistent, and probably work for the
general case, here we take an alternative stance: we will assume that proper-
ties —representing the same quantity to be measured— are indistinguishable
among the different contexts, but yet, not the same. To do so, we use quasi-set
theory [27], which is a logical formalism developed to deal with collections of
truly indistinguishable entities. Quasi-sets have been applied to quantum me-
chanics before, in order to describe quantum non-individuality [11, 12, 13], and
as above mentioned, to avoid Kochen-Specker-type contradictions [9]. We see
our approach as having two advantages over the more general one of [14]. First,
it comes from a strong ontological assumption that quantum systems are truly,
and in principle, non-distinguishable. This does not seem to be an epistemic
issue, as there are real consequences for this indistinguishability at the level
of particles (i.e. different quantum statistics, or other quantum effects such as
Bose-Einstein condensates). The second advantage is that our approach stays
closer to the Hilbert space representations of quantum theory by using the same
random objects for all contexts.
This paper is organized as follows. For each section, we try to provide
an intuitive and simplified version of the concepts discussed, and then present
them in a more formal way. Our goal is to make this paper more accessible to a
broader audience who may not be familiar with some of the ideas used here. In
Section 2 we discuss the concept of properties for quantum systems, and show
how they are problematic because of contextuality. In Section 3 we show how we
can represent indistinguishability of particles using the formalism of quasi-sets,
constructed formally as an axiomatic theory where Leibniz’s principle of identity
is violated. Then, in Section 4 we extend the ideas of Section 3 to properties,
and we show how when properties are indistinguishable the usual contextual
inequalities are not derivable. We end the paper with some conclusions and
final remarks in Section 5.
3
2 Describing quantum systems
In order to discuss the quantum case, let us start with the general concept of
properties1. Intuitively, a property is a characteristic or quality of something.
For example, when we say that “the sky is blue”, the color blue is a characteristic
of how we perceive the sky. In physics, when we talk about properties of a
system, we mean something similar: what characteristics this system has. For
instance, if we say that a metal block is 32cm long or 400g in mass, these
statements represents properties the block has: the property of being 32cm
long and having a mass of 400g. This concept of property is straightforward in
classical physics, where we can talk about volumes of solids, temperature of an
object, or energy of a system, to mention a few.
The most basic type of property is a binary property, i.e. a quality of the sys-
tem that is either true or false. In other words, we can probe whether a system
has or does not have the property. Some simple examples of binary properties
are represented in the following questions: “Does Federico have the property of
being tall?” or “Is it cold today?” Of course, such casual properties are not
what we are talking about in physics, and we need to be more precise, going
beyond defining which height we think is the minimum for being considered tall,
or what temperature below which we feel it is cold.
As such, in physics we need to talk about more complicated properties that
can account for more specificity, such as today’s temperature in C (it is 13
C outside, reads someone’s thermometer) instead of simply saying it is cold
or not. It is straightforward to see that even such properties are made up
of several binary properties. Let us examine the temperature example. To
measure the temperature means to give a number that is within the range of
the thermometer (say -20 to 60 C) and that is consistent with its precision
(±0.5 C). Consider the following series of statements that can be either true
or false. A−20=“the tip of the mercury column of the thermometer is in the
interval −20.0±0.5”, A−19=“the tip of the mercury column of the thermometer
is in the interval −19.0 ± 0.5”, A−18=“the tip of the mercury column of the
thermometer is in the interval −18.0 ± 0.5”, and so on until A60=“the tip of
the mercury column of the thermometer is in the interval 60.0± 0.5”. Each of
those statements are compatible (i.e. one can verify the veracity of each of those
questions simultaneously), and they are complementary (i.e. one and only one of
them may be true at a given time). So, the statement “it is 13 C outside” means
that the proposition A13=“the tip of the mercury column of the thermometer is
in the interval 13.0±0.5” is true, whereas all other complementary propositions
Ai, i 6= 13, are false. In fact, any numerical property could be represented
this way, as made up of several individual and compatible binary properties.
So, properties such as mass, charge, position, temperature, entropy, length, etc.
can be though as a combination of a large (sometimes infinite) number of binary
1We shall not give a detailed theory of properties relevant to the empirical sciences, and the
interested reader may find references such as [23, 24], [29] or [36] as useful and comprehensive
resources; see also [2, 20, 17] for the notion of property in the quantum logical approach, which
plays a key role in quantum mechanics and the derivation of the Kochen-Specker theorem.
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properties where only one of them can be true at a time.
There is an interesting connection between properties and ontology in clas-
sical physics. For example, in classical Newtonian physics, physical systems are
composed of particles, whose fundamental properties are their mass, position,
and velocity. Because mass is a constant for Newtonian particles, only position
and velocity can vary, and the value of all particles’ positions and momenta are
called the state of the system. Any other property, such as the system’s energy,
temperature, or length (if talking about a solid made of particles itself) are de-
finable in terms of the properties of the fundamental constituents of the system,
the particles, namely their position and velocity. Furthermore, given a system
of particles and their interactions, knowing their state, i.e. their position and
velocity, completely determines their future state, and therefore any properties
associated to the system. But, more importantly, given that properties are de-
finable in terms of two quantities that are simultaneously measurable, position
and velocity, it follows that each property can be though as a subset of the space
of all possible positions and velocities (usually R6N , where N is the number of
particles and 6 the number of components of the position and velocity vectors
necessary to describe the particle). Therefore, if we wish to define an algebra of
properties, this algebra would be simply a Borel algebra on R6N .
In quantum theory, things are very different. First, there is no simple and
widely accepted ontology for quantum systems similar to the classical one 2.
Second, the state of a quantum system is not definable in terms of the posi-
tion and velocity of its particles. The reason is a fundamental one: contrary
to classical particles, position and velocity of a quantum particle cannot be, in
principle, measured simultaneously with as much precision as we wish. There-
fore, the idea of defining properties as subsets of R6N is not a straightforward
matter 3.
Instead, binary properties are represented in quantum theory by projection
operators in a separable Hilbert space, H [2, 13]. The Hilbert space itself is
determined by the number of such binary properties that we can maximally
observables. More complex outcomes of experiments and their associated prop-
erties are modeled by self-adjoint operators in H. Due to the spectral decompo-
sition theorem, Hermitian operators can always be written as sums of projection
operators. In other words, we can think of Hermitian operators as made up of
several binary properties, which, due to their connections to experiments, are
called observables. Thus, observables and the Hilbert space are dependent not
only on the system, but on our ability to extract information from this system.
The more information, the larger the Hilbert space becomes.
To give a less abstract example, take the case of a single electron. If we
2It is important to mention that Bohm’s theory [4] provides an ontology close to a classical
one, but it is far from being widely accepted among physicists [33]. One of the main reasons
for this, is, perhaps, that its hidden-variables behave in a manifestly non-local way. Further-
more, the hidden-variables introduced are not of much use in practice, given that they cannot
be manipulated in the lab (due to its hidden character). Thus, they play only an ad-hoc
explanatory role, without giving place to any relevant predictions. Our approach in this work
aims to stay closer to most physicists guiding intuitions in their practice.
3Attempts to do so lead to quasi-probability distributions [41].
5
were only able to measure its position on the x direction, its Hilbert space
would be L2, the space of all square integrable functions, and a vector in this
space would be a function ψ ∈ L2 whose absolute value squared, |ψ(x)|2, at x
gives the probability density that the electron is found between x and x + dx
if a measurement of position is performed. In this Hilbert space, the position
operator is simply x. Correspondingly, the observable associated to the property
“momentum” is the operator i~∂/∂x on L2. However, electrons have another
property of interest: spin. The Hilbert space for spin 1/2, as is the case for
the electron, is C2. So, if we were to only measure position or momentum,
the Hilbert space would be L2; if we were to only measure spin (regardless of
direction), the Hilbert space would be C2; if we were to measure both position
and spin, the Hilbert space would be L2 ⊗ C2. Things get more complicated
as we increase the number of particles, or if we increase the number of possible
observables.
As mentioned above, properties related to a Hilbert space through observable
operators. Given a quantum system S, we can construct a Hilbert space H,
whose basis represent a set of possible projection operators that completely
span H. This set of projection operators provide a maximal set of compatible
properties of S. We can then use those properties to create more complex
properties in the form of Hermitian operators.
Again, let us explore this with a simple example: a three-dimensional Hilbert
space, C3. Since this space is three-dimensional, it follows that a basis for this
space is constituted of three linearly independent vectors, say
e1 =

 10
0

 , e2 =

 01
0

 , e3 =

 00
1

 .
and the corresponding projectors associated to each vectors are
Pe1 =

 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0

 , Pe2 =

 0 0 00 1 0
0 0 0

 , Pe3 =

 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 1

 .
We can see that Pe1 + Pe2 + Pe3 = 1ˆ, where 1ˆ is the identity matrix, which is a
consequence of e1, e2, and e3 forming a basis for H. It is easy to create now, in
this formalism, an observable that is associated to the property of having values
1, 2, and 3 as simply Pe1 + 2Pe2 + 3Pe3 .
Once you have a basis for H, you can define observables as above. However,
it is always possible to define another basis. In quantum theory, this new basis
will correspond to new observable properties. What is important here is that a
property with a definite value in one basis may not be associated with a state
that has definite values for another property (represented by another basis).
Furthermore, once we measure the observable associated to the new basis, and
find out a value for a given property, the new state of the system will be asso-
ciated to this property, and the old basis (and their corresponding properties)
6
will not have definite values anymore. An observation (or measurement) affects
the state of the system.
In other words, the sequential observation of properties in different basis
may lead to changes in the outcomes of past observations. Properties become
dependent on the how we observe them: if we first observe A and then B, we may
get something different from observing B and then A. Even more importantly,
if we observe A, B, and then A, the second time we observe A its value may
be different. Additionally, attempts to assign values to properties that are
independent of how we observe them will lead to inconsistencies.
The above argument is at the core of KS’s theorem [22]. In an example
provided by Cabello et al. [5], we start with a specific set of projection operators
Pi, i = 1, . . . , 18, in a Hilbert space of dimension four. The set {Pi} is selected
such that there are 9 contexts such that the sum of the four Pi’s in it is the
identity operator (e.g. P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 = 1ˆ). Furthermore, the contexts are
selected such that each projector appears twice, once in two different contexts
(e.g. P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 = 1ˆ and P1 + P5 + P6 + P7 = 1ˆ). The consequence is
that we have 9 equations, one for each context, where they all add to 1ˆ, and
such that each operator appears twice. Now, the contradiction comes from the
fact that if we associate to each projector a property of being 1 (for true) and
0 (for false) as the same in all contexts, the sum of all projectors’ values on the
9 equations adds to an even number (each appears twice). However, since each
equation adds to one, their sum needs to add to nine, which is odd, and we
reach a contradiction. This is the essence of the KS theorem: the assumption
that the values of Pi are independent of context lead to a contradiction.
One may object that the above arguments were focused solely on cases where
the property of the system is known with certainty, i.e. one can assign to it
a truth value. One may argue that in quantum physics, properties are not
deterministic, and one must talk about probabilities, which would make the
above arguments not apply. However, this is not the case. It is possible to show
that the underlying assumption that properties have a value, even though we
may not know what they are and represent them with a probability function, is
incompatible with quantum theory [16]. The reason is that standard probability
theory assumes an underlying consistency through a Boolean algebra.
To accommodate the quantum predictions, one must either expand the num-
ber of properties to include other properties that are co-measured (see [15] and
references therein), or one needs to modify probability theory, either by allowing
probabilities to take negative values [34, 7, 6], by changing the rule for adding
probabilities [35, 8], by modifying the algebra of events [17, 30, 18], or by re-
thinking about measurement outputs as depending on all components of an
examined experiment [21]. But regardless of how we choose to deal with such
issues, the key aspect of the quantum world is that quantum properties are not
definable in a consistent way if we require classical logic and context indepen-
dence. This quantum contextuality is essential for any ontology associated to
it, and we will explore it in more details in Section 4.
3 Indistinguishability of particles
There are two remarkable features that characterize compound quantum sys-
tems. One of them is entanglement, that can be interpreted as the impossibility
of describing certain quantum correlations by appealing to mixtures of classical
correlations [40]. The other feature —the one that we are interested in— is indis-
tinguishability: when quantum systems of the same kind are put together, they
display statistics which are very different from those which are used to describe
distinguishable entities4. This is expressed in the symmetrization postulate and
the celebrated Bose and Fermion statistics. This feature lies behind very im-
portant fields of research, such as the study of Bose-Einstein condensates. In
recent years, the difference between entanglement and indistinguishability has
been studied in detail: it turns out that these are very different physical features,
in the sense that a quantum system can be prepared in a fully symmetrized state
in which no non-local correlations are present [32]. This distinction leads us to
the question of whether it is possible to consider quantum indistinguishability as
a resource. What is the relationship, if any, between quantum indistinguishabil-
ity and contextuality? In order to explore possible answers for these questions
in the following sections, let us first review the formalism for indistinguishable
particles.
Let us illustrate how the formalism works for only two fermions. For this
case, if we know that one particle is in state |b〉 and the other in state |a〉, then,
using the symmetrization postulate, the joint state will be given by
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉 ⊗ |b〉 − |b〉 ⊗ |a〉) (1)
The above state means that there is one particle in each state. But the sym-
metrization tells us that we cannot tell which one is which: a permutation of the
particles yields an overall minus sign, and thus, the probabilistic predictions of
the theory are exactly the same. This situation lead many authors —including
E. Schro¨dinger— to conclude that quantum systems, in certain situations, can-
not be considered as individuals [25].
In the position representation, the wave function associated to our two-
particle state in (1) is given by
ψ(x, y) =
1√
2
(ψa(x)⊗ ψb(y)− ψb(x)⊗ ψa(y)), (2)
where x and y are the coordinates of particles 1 and 2. When x −→ y, i.e. when
the particles are close to each other, we observe that the square modulus of the
4We emphasize that the indistinguishability of particles is an ontological assumption. For
example, as mentioned before, in Bohmian theory [4, 3] the ontology is classical, with quantum
effects originating from a quantum potential. The anti-symmetrization or symmetrization of
the wave function, thus, in this theory, leads to non-local effects on the particles due to the
quantum potential. Though the authors of this paper are sympathetic to Bohm’s approach, we
are also aware that the majority of the physics community rejects it, perhaps mainly because
of its classical ontology. In this paper, we embrace the quantum weirdness, and try to explain
quantum effects based on a non-classical ontology of indistinguishable particles.
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wave function
|ψ(x, y)|2 = 1
2
(|ψa(x)ψb(y)|2+ |ψb(x)ψa(y)|2−2ℜ(ψa(x)ψb(y)ψ⋆b (x)ψ⋆a(y))) (3)
tends to zero. This implies that no two fermions can be found occupying the
same state. If the wave functions |ψa(x)| and |ψb(y)|2 have compact support,
we see that there are no indistinguishability effects when |x − y| is big enough.
Thus, when the particles get close each other, we can go continuously from a
distinguishability for all practical purposes situation, to a non-distinguishability
one.
The state of a Bosonic system is similar to (1), but there is “+” sign instead of
a “−”. In the first case, the states are symmetric under permutation of particles,
while in the second, anti-symmetric. This changes the statistics considerably:
unlike Fermions, it is possible to have an arbitrary number of Bosons occupying
the same state.
In order to study the case with arbitrary particle number, it is useful to
consider the Fock-space formalism. The standard Fock-space is built up from
the one particle Hilbert spaces as follows. Let H be a Hilbert space and define
H0 = C,
H1 = H,
H2 = H ⊗H,
...
Hn = H ⊗ · · · ⊗H. (4)
The Fock-space is thus constructed as the direct sum of n particle Hilbert spaces,
F =
∞⊕
n=0
H
n. (5)
When dealing with bosons or fermions, the symmetrization postulate must be
imposed. Thus, given a vector v = v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vn ∈ Hn, define
σn(v) = (
1
n!
)
∑
P
P (v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vn) (6)
and
τn(v) = (
1
n!
)
∑
P
spP (v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vn), (7)
where
sp =
{
1 if p is even,
−1 if p is odd.
Let
H
n
σ = {σn(v) : v ∈ Hn} (8)
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and
H
n
τ = {τn(v) : v ∈ Hn}. (9)
Thus, we have the Fock-space
Fσ =
∞⊕
n=0
H
n
σ (10)
for bosons and
Fτ =
∞⊕
n=0
H
n
τ (11)
for fermions.
The standard wave mechanics approach to the description of multi-particle
systems uses the kinetic energy operator
Tn =
n∑
i=1
T1(ri) (12)
for n particles, where T1(r) = −(~2∇22m ). A similar expression holds for the
external potential. For a pairwise interaction potential, we have
Vn =
n∑
i>j=1
V2(ri, rj). (13)
The total Hamiltonian operator is thus given by
Hn =
n∑
i=1
[(−~
2∇2i
2m
) + V1(ri) +
n∑
i>j=1
V2(ri, rj)]. (14)
The n-particles wave function can be expressed as
Ψn(r1, . . . , rn, t), (15)
and it is a solution of the Schro¨dinger’s equation
HnΨn = i~
∂
∂t
Ψn. (16)
4 Indistinguishability of properties
We now move to discuss what we call the indistinguishability of properties,
starting with the concept of properties. Suppose that we have the quantum
system formed by parts S1 and S2. The observables associated to the compound
system will be represented by the algebra B(H), with H = H1 ⊗H2. For any
observable A of S1, we may consider the observable of the compound system
A⊗B. The interpretation of A⊗B is that we measure A in S1 and B in S2. But
10
for each A ∈ B(H1), there are infinitely many possible observables to chose in
B(H2). Each one of these possibilities, defines a different measurement context.
Thus, we can define the set
CA = {A⊗B |B ∈ B(H2)}
that enable us to represent all possible contexts associated to a single observable
A ∈ B(H1). Now, prepare N copies of the compound system in the same state
ρ and measure only observable A of S1. The state of S1 is given by ρ1 = tr2(ρ).
From the preparation point of view, all these processes are indistinguishable: we
prepare N copies of the compound system, and measure the same observable
A of S1. But, even if these measurements are indistinguishable for an observer
focused only on S1, they are not exactly the same: a measurement of A in S1
could be performed jointly with an arbitrary element of CA, and these elements
could change on each run of the experiment. As an example, if N = N1+N2, we
can perform the experiment A⊗B N1 times, andN2 times the experiment A⊗B′
(for B 6= B′). Thus, each context defined on the compound system, gives us a
different observable on the compound system, but an indistinguishable one for
system S1. Thus, from the point of view of the observer focused on subsystem
S1, a measurement of the property associated to the physical quantity A can be
represented by a collection of indistinguishable but yet different observables.
There is a formalism that allows to deal properly with collections of truly
indiscernible entities, namely, quasi-set theory (for details, see for example [27,
11, 12, 13]). In this theory, there is a primitive notion of indistinguishability,
represented by the symbol “≡”. The axioms are written in such a way that,
X ≡ Y does not necessarily implies X = Y . The equality symbol “=”, can
only be applied on special elements of the theory (i.e., the classical ones). Thus,
we can represent the observable quantity A by a quasi-set, that we call [A],
formed by the collection of all possible experimental contexts associated to A.
The elements of [A] are all indistinguishable, but not the same (i.e., the quasi-
cardinal —which represents the number of elements— of [A] is greater than
1), in the sense that X ≡ Y , for all X,Y ∈ [A]. What are the valuations
compatible with this description? We must be careful. Using quasi-set theory,
if we try to assign a value to each element of [A], we define a quasi-functionf :
[A] −→ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1} (here, we are assuming that A defines a d-dimensional
observable). But, unlike the classical case, were we have d♯[A] valuations, there
are only d quasi-functions of this kind, namely: 〈[A], 0〉, 〈[A], 1〉, · · · , 〈[A], d−1〉.
This is so, due to the fact that all ordered pairs collapse into the same class.
This means that, considered as an observable, the only values that A can take
are given by {0, 1, · · · , d − 1}. This is compatible with what we observe in an
actual experiment: the outcome set is given by {0, 1, · · · , d−1}. But something
more interesting happens when we try to actually put values to the elements of
[A] previous to measurement. Let us do this as follows. In order to pick up one
element of [A], consider a strong singleton [[X ]] ⊆ [A]. In quasi-set notation,
this means that qc([[X ]]) = 1 and ∀x ∈ [[X ]], we have x ∈ [A]. Now, take
j ∈ {0, 1, ·, d − 1} and form the ordered pair 〈[[X ]]; j〉 in such a way that the
pair has only two elements (this can be done in quasi-set theory). This pair can
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X Y Z XY XZ YZ
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 -1 1 -1 -1
1 -1 1 -1 1 -1
-1 1 1 -1 -1 1
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
-1 -1 1 1 -1 -1
-1 1 -1 -1 1 -1
-1 -1 -1 1 1 1
be interpreted as follows: assign the value j to the context [[X ]]. All contexts are
indistinguishable from the perspective of the observer associated to S1, in the
sense that, if the rest of the universe is ignored, each representative of the class
[A] is indistinguishable from the others. But they are different from the point
of view of the joint system, since the different contexts define distinguishable
global observables. By forming pairs of the form 〈[[X ]]; j〉, a definite value
can be assigned to an observable in a given context. But an indistinguishable
observable taken from a different context may have a different value. In this
way, we see how a kind of logical indistinguishability, one taken from quasi-set
theory, can be used to model quantum contextuality in a suitable way.
In order to illustrate the description of contextuality using quasi-set theory
with more detail, lets consider first a classical system formed of three dichotomic
random variables X , Y and Z, having values in the set {−1, 1}. Let us assume
that X , Y and Z obey the classical theory of identity (and accordingly, that
these variables retain their identity among the different contexts in which they
may appear). Thus, for example, we are assuming that X is the same, indepen-
dently of whether it is measured in connection with Y or in connection with Z.
A similar consideration holds for Y and Z. In this way, we obtain the following
(classical) table:
Using the above table, a quick check indicates that the values the compound
random variables XY , XZ and Y Z, satisfy the inequality
− 1 ≤ XY +XZ + Y Z ≤ 3. (17)
Thus, by convexity, their mean values 〈XY 〉, 〈XZ〉 and 〈Y Z〉 must, in turn,
satisfy
− 1 ≤ 〈XY 〉+ 〈XZ〉+ 〈Y Z〉 ≤ 3. (18)
Now, let us see what happens if, instead of assuming a classical theory
of identity, we consider that X , Y and Z define indistinguishable properties.
Thus, the only thing we can say is that we have classes of indistinguishable
properties [X ], [Y ] and [Z], formed by all possible indistinguishables from X ,
Y and Z, respectively. Thus, when considering, for example, X in connection
with Y and afterwards, in connection with Z, we will haveX and X ′Z ′, with X ′
indistinguishable from X and Z ′ indistinguishable from Z —yet not the same!
Thus, the value that we must assign to X needs not to be the same than the
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X’Y’ X”Z’ Y”Z”
1 1 1
1 -1 -1
-1 1 -1
-1 -1 1
-1 -1 1
1 -1 -1
-1 1 -1
-1 -1 -1
1 1 -1
1 -1 1
-1 1 1
one that we assign to X ′. Therefore, if we proceed as before and consider all
possibilities, we don’t have a definite value for X , but a collection of them: a
value attached to each element of the class [X ], by appealing to quasi-pairs of
the form 〈[[X ]],−1〉 and 〈[[X ]], 1〉 (being [[X ]] ⊆ [X ] a strong singleton of [X ]).
A similar consideration holds for Y and Z. The only think we can do, regarding
joint measurements, is to write down a table like:
where the primed quantities are indistinguishables from X , Y and Z. Notice
that the last four lines of the above table are strictly forbidden for classical
random variables. Or, in our terminology, for random variables obeying the
classical theory of identity. But this implies that inequality (18) will be violated
by random variables of this sort. Thus, we find that the violation of the theory
of identity for properties, can be used to describe contextuality in a natural way.
It is important to remark that this is not a quantum example. The reason is
that, for three projection operators that commute pairwise, it follows that it is
possible to define a set of vectors on the Hilbert space such that those vectors are
eigen-vectors of those projectors. Therefore, it follows that a joint probability
distribution exists, and the properties associated to the projectors are not con-
textual. But, in principle, we could extend the argument to a Bell-type scenario
with four properties if necessary (though it would be more cumbersome).
It is interesting to compare our approach with previous ones. The KS the-
orem has a very straightforward consequence: to assume that a given property
possesses the same value among different contexts leads to contradictions. This
has led many authors to conclude random variables –representing the same phys-
ical quantity– are different. In other words, that contexts can be used to index
random variables in such a way that they become different (see for example
[14]. According to the classical theory of identity, this sounds as a reasonable
conclusion. But still, there remains a feeling that, with such a proliferation of
properties –in most examples of interest, there are, indeed, infinitely many con-
texts for each given property– a high ontological price is paid, special when we
consider that it is the same physical quantity among all possible contexts. Our
framework is a way out of this situation, in the sense that, one is able to speak
about indistinguishable properties in a strong sense, but, at the same time, the
13
instances of these properties are not forced to obtain the same values on each
context in which they are considered.
5 Conclusions
In this work we proposed a formal framework for dealing with properties of
contextual systems. According to our proposal, properties describing the same
physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts, are not dif-
ferent, but neither are they equal. They are indistinguishable in a strong sense.
The existence of such objects require, mathematically, the introduction of a the-
ory that allows a violation of Leibnitz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles.
Quasi-set theory is such a theory, a set-theoretical framework that allows for
the description of collections of entities which do not obey the classical principle
identity [26, 27, 25]. Quasi-set theory includes objects that obey a weaker rela-
tionship of indistinguishability, allowing for entities being different solo numero.
Here we showed that quasi-sets can be used to describe quantum contextuality
in a consistent way. We believe this approach opens the door for a new ontology
for describing quantum properties.
It is useful to compare our proposal with other ones. In the contextual-
ity by default approach (CdB), properties belonging to different contexts are
considered different ab initio. If this is done, we can assume that not only
properties obey the classical theory of identity, but they also satisfy classical
probability theory. The cost of such approach is that properties then become
context-dependent, and thus dependent on the observer’s choice of context. Our
framework is an alternative one, that allows to reconcile the fact that the same
quantity may acquire different values in different measurement contexts. In the
other approaches using non-standard probability, it is possible to argue (and
we did so in Section 4) that the use of indistinguishable objects from quasi-set
leads to non-standard probabilities. This, in a sense, may provides an inter-
pretation for the appearance of non-standard theories in quantum physics, and
we believe it is a topic that should be investigated further. As such, it would
also be interesting to study the consequences for probability theory of assuming
random variables that do not obey the classical theory of identity. Such a non-
standard probability calculus may be useful to understand the peculiar behavior
of probabilities in quantum theory. In this direction —and, in connection with
the problem of identical particles— we hope that by addressing contextuality
in quantum theory using quasi-sets, may help to understand the link between
the underlying quantum particle ontology and their properties.
The ontology behind our approach assumes that properties are, in reality, as-
sociated to collections of indistinguishable entities. This ontology has interesting
consequences for answering the following question: which are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for contextuality? According to our proposal, contextual-
ity appears whenever properties depart from classical identity theory. But there
could be many ways in which this may happen, being quantum mechanics a par-
ticular case. This opens the door for studying generalized probabilistic models
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using quasi-set theory or similar set-theoretical frameworks. In particular, it
would be interesting to investigate which constraints in the indistinguishability
of properties would produce the quantum boundaries, such as Tsirelson’s.
The main advantage of our approach is that it is a more natural description
of what happens to properties in the quantum realm. The main disadvantage is
that it is not as general as other proposals, such as contextuality by default, as
it would not be applicable to non-quantum contextual systems, since we expect
such systems to not have an ontological issue with identity. But, perhaps more
interesting from the point of view of this paper’s authors, is that our approach
points toward a feasible quantum ontology —perhaps a physical principle— that
needs to be thought in more detail.
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